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Schwartz: Adjudication and the Administrative Procedure Act

ADJUDICATION AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT
Bernard Schwartzt

As Scripture might have said, "Let us now praise famous laws." The Federal Administrative Procedure Act is the famous law that has made a seismic
change in our administrative law. More specifically, the APA has transformed
administrative adjudication in this country. Before the changes made by the
APA in adjudicatory procedure are discussed, a word should be said about preAPA adjudication in the federal administrative process.
PRE-APA ADJUDICATION

Wordsworth begins a poem with the words, "Oh! what's the matter?
What's the matter?"' A prosaic question like that is not always easy to answer.2 Nor is it easy to state in a simple sentence the problems with agency
adjudication before the APA. Well before that statute, the requirement of an
evidentiary hearing had been imposed upon the adjudicatory process. It had,
however, long been settled that the required hearing need not be held before the
agency heads who had the power to make the decision? Instead, there was a
bifurcation in the processes of hearing and decision: the agency heads decided,
but they did so upon the basis of a hearing record made before someone else.4
The job of hearing the evidence was delegated to subordinates on the agency
staff.5

t Chapman Distinguished Professor of Law, The University of Tulsa College of Law.
1. William Wordsworth, Goody Blake and Harry Gill, A True Story, in I WILLIAM WORDSWORTH: THE
POEMS 271 (John 0. Hayden ed., Yale Univ. Press 1981).
2. With substantially these two sentences, Lord Hewart began his famous attack upon the lawlessness
of English administrative agencies. LORD HEwART OF BURY, THE NEW DESPOTISM 3 (1929).
3. See Guerrero v. New Jersey, 643 F.2d 148, 149 (3d Cir. 1981).
4. See id.

5. See id.
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Examiners Not Judges
Before the APA, the presiding officer at agency hearings was a staff member to whom the job of hearing officer had been delegated. As summarized by
the leading official study, "In general, it has been customary to designate hearing officers before whom evidence may be adduced - whether they be a board
of three or more individuals, or, as is more common, a single hearing officer,
variously known as a trial examiner, a referee, a presiding officer, a district
engineer, a deputy commissioner, or a register."6 In almost all agencies of consequence, there were enough hearings so that hearing officers could be assigned
only to the job of hearing cases. Their pre-APA generic title was trial examiner
the title used in the major federal regulatory agencies. The title "examiners"
was apparently first used in the Hepburn Act of 1906, which authorized the
ICC to employ examiners to administer oaths, examine witnesses, and receive
evidence.7
Before the APA, the courts compared the trial examiner to a Chancery
master.8
[The master's] duty was not only to collect and collate but also to report
and recommend. With the growth of the centralized and centrally placed
quasi-judicial body, the time-space factor compelled an increased resort to
both kinds of assistant. So nearly everyone of the Federal Boards employs
some kind of field hearer. The Labor Board Examiner at first blush seems
to fall into the more important and elevated category. He may be called
on, as here, to file an intermediate report with recommendations. As he
need not be required to do so and as even his unexcepted-to recommendations are not always treated with much respect by the parent board, his
position is, as the writer has said, somewhat hybrid. But whether more
strictly an examiner or, a fortiori, a master, he has not the automatic character of the slot machine or the stenographer.9
InstitutionalDecisions
Despite the famous statement in the first Morgan case - "[t]he one who
decides must hear"' - the agency head, who alone had the pre-APA power
to decide, did not hear. The hearing was presided over by a staff member who
had no power to decide. In many agencies, the examiner could file a recommended decision, but, as pointed out by the judge quoted, "his ... recommendations are not always treated with much respect."" So far as the parties were
concerned, the examiner was the administrative equivalent of the trial judge.
Yet he was a "judge" controlled by the agency (usually, we shall see, the oppo-

6.
7.
8.
42 F.2d
9.
10.
11.

REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 44 (1941).

See Hepburn Act of 1906, ch. 3591, § 7, 34 Stat. 584, 594 (1906).
See Unity School v. Federal Radio Com'n, 64 F.2d 550, 551 (D.C. Cir. 1933); Raladam Co. v. FTC,
430, 432 (6th Cir. 1930).
NLRB v. Baldwin Locomotive Works, 128 F.2d 39, 54-55 (3d Cir. 1942).
Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 481 (1936) [hereinafter Morgan I].
Baldwin Locomotive Works, 128 F.2d at 55.
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site party) and one who was more a monitor than a true judge, since he did not
have power to decide the case.
Just as troubling was the fact that, the rule of Morgan I notwithstanding,
the agency head did not personally decide the case. Though the relevant statutes
provided that it was the agency head who was to decide, the decision was not
that of the agency head in a literal sense. The case and the examiner's report
would be referred to the different parts of the agency, which would deal with
the issues in which they were competent. In that way, questions of law, engineering, accounting, and the like would be decided by specialists. The final
decision would be the result of this cooperative process within the agency. The
agency decision was an institutional decision, rather than a personal one by the
agency head in whose name it was issued.
To those affected, the institutional decision of an agency was just as unsatisfactory as that type of decision would be if rendered by a court. The great
objection was that nobody knew exactly how the institutional decision was
arrived at. The procedure in the Morgan case can be taken as an example.
The private individuals there were granted a hearing before an examiner and
oral argument before the Assistant Secretary of Agriculture. 3 But the decision
took place in the recesses of the Department of Agriculture, and the private
parties heard no more of the case until they were served with the agency order.
The decision was signed by the Secretary of Agriculture, 4 but we know from
the Morgan case that the decision was his only in a formal sense. It is impossible to say who made the actual decision - what official in the department
really directed his mind to the evidence and arguments and drew therefrom the
final conclusions adopted by the Secretary. ' The examiner probably discussed
the case with his superior, the latter discussed it with a bigger flea, and so ad
infinitum. Ultimately the decision got the seal of the Secretary. "Such a procedure can obviously result in a decision which reflects the analysis of persons
other than the administrator, and hence the designation as an 'anonymous
decision' is apt."' 6
As the conduct of an agency hearing "becomes divorced from responsibility for decision two undesirable consequences ensue. The hearing itself degenerates, and the decision becomes anonymous."' 7 Decision by a known tribunal is
vital to the belief that justice is being done. In the agencies, Chief Justice
Rehnquist tells us, "there is a feeling that ...one doesn't exactly know who is
making 8the decisions, and that the process is a little bit of a personnel shell
game.'

12. Morgan I, 298 U.S. at 472.
13. See id. at 478.
14. See id. at 477.
15. See id. at 479.
16. Turner v. Apollonio, 441 A.2d 679, 682 (Me. 1982).
17. REPORT, supra note 6, at 45.
18. Justice William H. Rehnquist, Luncheon Address (Mar. 18. 1976), in Luncheon with Mr. Justice
Rehnquist, 28 ADMIN. L. REV. 614, 616 (1976).
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Nowhere was this thought better expressed than in the comment of Dean
Acheson, Chairman of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative
Procedure:
[T]he agency is one great obscure organization with which the citizen has
to deal. It is absolutely amorphous. He pokes it in one place and it comes
out another. No one seems to have specific authority. There is someone
called the commission, the authority; a metaphysical omniscient brooding
thing which sort of floats around the air and is not a human being. That is
what is baffling ...There is no [sic] idea that Mr. A heard the case and
then it goes into this great building and mills around and comes out with
a commissioner's name on it but what happens in between is a mystery.
That is what bothers people. 9
Combination of Functions
The pre-APA problem of the institutional decision was compounded by
that of the combination of functions. Most important federal agencies (particularly regulatory agencies) have been made the repositories of all three types of
governmental power. In the administrative process, the different "stages of
making and applying law have been telescoped into a single agency. In this
concentration customary and separate procedures have disappeared."2
In particular, an agency such as the FTC combines the functions of investigator, prosecutor, and judge: "The Federal Trade Commission investigates
charges of business immorality, files a charge in its own name as plaintiff, and
then decides whether the proof sustains the charges it has preferred."'" The
same combination of functions exists in other agencies. These agencies are all
parties, as well as judges, in cases that they have the power to decide.22 "The
agency which prescribes rules is also the investigator, the prosecutor, the judge,
and to a large extent the appellate tribunal."' Unlike a court, which occupies
an arbitral position between two contesting parties, the agency may be both an
interested party and a trier of the contentions advanced by its counsel at the
hearing.
The Supreme Court itself has characterized the combination-of-functions
issue as substantial. Justice Brennan expressed his concern when he was a state
judge. Uneasiness over combination, he said,
springs from the fear that the agency official adjudicating upon private
rights cannot wholly free himself from the influences toward partiality
inherent in his identification with the investigative and prosecuting aspects
of the case; in other words, that the atmosphere in which he must make
his judgments is not conducive to the critical detachment toward the case

19. Administrative Procedure,Hearingson S.674, S.675, and S.918,before a Subcommittee of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary,77th Cong. 816 (1941).
20. REPORT, supra note 6, at 204.
21. Brinkley v. Hassig, 83 F.2d 351, 357 (10th Cir. 1936).
22. See id.
23. REPORT, supra note 6, at 204.
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expected of the judge. In a sense the combination of functions violates the
ancient tenet of Anglo-American justice that "No man shall be a judge in
his own cause." 4
A state judge recently put the matter more strongly: "I still would not
allow a hearing in which [the agency] acted as both prosecutor and judge. This
for the same reason that we do not allow the prosecutor and judge in our court
system to be the same person or even from the same branch of government."'
There is no doubt that, before the APA, administrative lawyers agreed with
Dean Landis that "[n]o one can fail to recognize that there are dangers implicit
,." Combined with the institutional deciin this combination of functions..
sion process, the danger was that combination made it impossible to preserve
the appearance of justice. "The litigant often feels that, in this combination of
functions within a single tribunal or agency, he has lost all opportunity to argue
his case to an unbiased official and that he has been deprived of safeguards he
has been taught to revere."'27
APA REFORMS

InternalSeparation
According to the Supreme Court, a "fundamental... purpose [of the APA
was] to curtail and change the practice of embodying in one person or agency
the duties of prosecutor and judge ....

[T]he safeguards it did set up were

intended to ameliorate the evils from the commingling of functions."28 The
APA provisions on the matter "did not go so far as to require a complete separation of investigating and prosecuting functions from adjudicating functions." 9 Instead, as Justice Brennan points out, "That statute embodies the
theory of internal separation, leaving the functions with the agency but providing safeguards to assure their insulation from one another and to further the
independence of personnel engaged in judging.""
The APA ensures internal separation by separating those in the agency
who investigate and prosecute from those who hear and decide (at least at the
initial level). As will be seen, APA hearings are conducted by independent
administrative law judges, who are not subject to agency control. ALJs are not
permitted to "consult a person or party on a fact in issue, unless on notice and
opportunity for all parties to participate."'" The prohibition is against consultation of "a person or party." The Supreme Court has said that this bars consulta-

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

In re Larsen, 86 A.2d 430, 435 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1952).
State Transp. Comm'n v. Ford, 844 P. 2d 496, 499 (Wyo. 1992) (Cardine, J., dissenting).
JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 95 (1938).
REPORT, supra note 6, at 204.
Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 41, 46 (1950).
Id. at 46.
In re Larsen, 86 A.2d 430, 436 (NJ. Super. CL App. Div. 1952).
5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(1) (1994).
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anyone, "including other agency officials, concerning a fact at istion with
32
sue."
In addition, those engaged in investigating or prosecuting are cut off from
the decision process: "An employee or agent engaged in the performance of
investigative or prosecuting functions for an agency in a case may not, in that
or a factually related case, participate or advise in the decision ... except as
witness or counsel in public proceedings. 33 The APA separation requires the
prosecutor and the adjudicator each to be responsible to the agency head by a
separate chain of authority.34
How the APA operates to prevent internal combinations of investigating
and judging, or prosecuting and judging, is shown by Wong Yang Sung v.
McGrath35 - still the leading case on the APA adjudicatory provisions. In that
case, said the Court, "we find the administrative hearing a perfect exemplification of the practices so unanimously condemned., 36 The hearing in an alien
deportation proceeding was "before an immigrant inspector, who, for purposes
of the hearing, [was] called the 'presiding inspector.' Except with the consent of
the alien, the presiding inspector may not be the one who investigated the
'
"But," as the Court pointed out, "the inspector's duties include investicase."37
gation of like cases; and while he is today hearing cases investigated by a colleague, tomorrow his investigation of a case may be heard before the inspector
whose case he passes on today."38 The presiding inspector conducted the case
on behalf of the government at the hearing. After its conclusion, he "prepare[d]
a summary of the evidence, proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a
proposed order."39
The safeguards set up by the APA were intended to ameliorate the evils
resulting from the combination of the functions of prosecutor and judge as
exemplified by the Wong Yang Sung proceeding. This, Wong Yang Sung asserted, was beyond doubt.
According to the Davis-Pierce treatise,' the Supreme Court ignored the
APA separation-of-functions provision when it upheld the three-hat ALJ system
in Social Security cases.4 In the Social Security hearing there is no agency
counsel to present the case against the claimant. Whatever questioning of the
claimant is necessary, apart from that by the claimant's own counsel, is done by
the ALJ; if, as in many cases, the claimant has no attorney, all the questioning
is by the judge.

32. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 514 (1978).
33. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1994).
34. See Columbia Research Corp. v. Schoffer, 256 F.2d 677, 680 (2d Cir. 1958).
35. 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
36. Id. at 45.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 46.
40. 2 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §9.9, at 95 (3d
ed. 1994).
41. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
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In one and the same case, the Social Security ALJ must represent the
claimant, represent the SSA, and make an independent decision. To describe
this situation, the SSA has used a "three hats" metaphor: "we use the terminology that we wear 'three hats'. We put on the first hat, and we represent the
claimant .... We then represent the government, the Social Security Administration. . . - that's the second hat .... Then we turn around and put on the
third hat, and we decide."'42
At first glance, this three-hat system may appear to contravene the APA
separation-of-functions requirements because the Social Security ALJ is not
limited to hearing and deciding. The ALJ also has the task of developing both
the claimant's and the government's case. The Court rejected an attack on the
multiple roles of the Social Security ALJ - what it called "the advocate-judgemultiple-hat suggestion"43 - holding that the roles did not involve any prohibited combination of prosecuting and judging: "The social security hearing examiner, furthermore, does not act as counsel. He acts as an examiner charged
with developing the facts."' In social security cases, there is no "prosecution"
as there was in the Wong Yang Sung deportation proceeding. The fact that ALJs
reverse in favor of the claimant in almost half the Social Security disability
cases "attests to the fairness of the system and refutes the implication of impropriety. 4 5
Administrative Judiciary
Even more significant than the APA separation-of-functions requirements
has been the setting up under the Act of an administrative trial judiciary. The
securing of qualified hearing officer personnel, the Supreme Court says, is "the
heart of formal administrative adjudication."' Indeed, so far as the parties appearing before them are concerned, the officers presiding at hearings are the
administrative equivalents of trial judges.47
Before the APA, as already seen, federal adjudicatory hearings were presided over by trial examiners and other hearing officers who were members of
the agency staffs. Instead of "trials" before independent hearers, the private
parties' only "judges" were agency subordinates subject to the control of the
opposing parties - at least in agencies in which the functions of prosecuting
and judging were combined.' In addition, those "judges" normally played no
significant part in the decision process. Though they were the ones who saw
and heard the evidence, they could at most only file recommended decisions

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Rausch v. Gardner, 267 F. Supp. 4, 6 (E.D. Wis. 1967).
Richardson, 402 U.S. at 410.
Id. This was before the ALJ title was conferred upon APA hearing officers.
Id.
Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 514 (1978).
See id. at 513.
'iee NLRB v. Baldwin Locomotive Works, 128 F.2d 39, 54-55 (3d Cir. 1992).
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which might "not always [be] treated with much respect by the [agency
heads]."49
The pre-APA situation was summarized in an Administrative Conference
report:
Prior to the APA, there were no reliable safeguards to ensure the objectivity and judicial capability of presiding officers in formal administrative
proceedings. Ordinarily these officers were subordinate employees chosen
by the agencies, and the power of the agencies to control and influence
such personnel made questionable any agency contention that its proceedings assured fundamental fairness. Furthermore, the role of the presiding
officer in an agency's decisional process was often unclear; many agencies would ignore the officer's decisions without giving reasons, and enter
their own de novo decisions."
The result was that, as the Supreme Court states, "[m]any complaints were
voiced against the actions of the hearing examiners, it being charged that they
were mere tools of the agency concerned and subservient to the agency heads in
making their proposed findings of fact and recommendations."'"
The report quoted above tells us that "[t]he APA was designed to correct
these conditions."52 It did so by setting up within each agency a corps of independent hearing officers who would not be subject to agency pressures.53 The
APA provided for appointment, by and for each agency, of as many hearing
examiners as needed to conduct hearings. 4 The examiners were to be assigned
to cases in rotation, so far as practicable, and to perform no duties inconsistent
with their duties as examiners. 5 "They may be removed only for good cause
established and determined by the Civil Service Commission after a hearing on
the record."56 Under these provisions, federal agencies had to select their examiners from a list of personnel found qualified by the Civil Service Commission, and examiners were to receive compensation prescribed by the Commission "independently of agency recommendations or ratings.""
The Supreme Court has said that these APA provisions were "intended to
make hearing examiners 'a special class of semi-independent subordinate hearing officers' by vesting control of their compensation, promotion and tenure in
the Civil Service Commission to a much greater extent than in the case of other
federal employees."58 The APA intent was to enable qualified examiners to be
chosen and to permit them to maintain the independence appropriate to a quasi-

49. Id. at 55.
50. ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
HEARINGS 10 (1980).
51. Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Exam'rs Conference, 345 U.S. 128, 131 (1953).
52. ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 50, at 10.
53. See 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1994).

54. See 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (1994).
55. See id.
56. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 514 (1978) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7521). The Civil Service Commis-

sion is now the Office of Personnel Management.
57. 5 U.S.C. § 5372 (1994).

58. Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Exam'rs Conference, 345 U.S. 128, 132 (1953).
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judge, by freeing them from direct agency control. "On paper at least," the
sponsor of the APA in the Senate said, "they are to be very nearly the equivalent of judges, albeit operating within the federal system of administrative justice." 9 The APA is structured to assure hearing officer independence, free
from pressures by the agency.' They were left within the agency for housekeeping purposes.6' But their appointment, compensation, and tenure were
largely removed from agency control and vested in the Civil Service Commission. The prohibition against removal except for good cause, after hearing, has
been broadly construed. Thus, it applies to involuntary removal and retirement
on a disability annuity; the APA is to be given a generous interpretation in light
of the over-riding objective of hearing officer independence. 2 Under the cases,
APA protection extends not only to removal, but also to demotions, suspensions, and other involuntary changes in status.6'
JudicialApotheosis
The APA set up the independent corps of hearing examiners just discussed.
Even more important has been the transformation of the examiner corps into an
administrative judiciary. In 1972, the Civil Service Commission promulgated a
regulation that changed the title of hearing officers appointed under the APA
from "hearing examiners" to "administrative law judges."64
Whether such a change might be made by the Commission without statutory authorization became academic when a 1978 statute confirmed the
Commission's action by providing that "hearing examiner" in the relevant APA
sections should be changed to "administrative law judge."' This change in
title elevated the status of hearing officers more than any other step could have
done. And the judicial apotheosis has been achieved at no cost - simply by a
change of name which was as painless as it was beneficial.
Perhaps the greatest accomplishment of the APA has been this elevation of
the federal hearing officer to the status of administrative judge, vested even
with the dignity of the judicial title. The importance of the ALJ corps set up by
the APA has been emphasized by the Supreme Court itself. In Butz v.
Economou, 6 the Court went out of its way to discuss "the role of the modem ... administrative law judge," which the Court said is "functionally comparable to that of a judge."'67 The Court described in detail the functions of ALJs

59.
38 GEO.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Pat McCarran, Three Years of the FederalAdministrative ProcedureAct - A Study in Legislation,
LJ. 574, 582 (1950).
See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978).
See Karl Stecher, I1 Admin. L.2d (P & F) 868 (Civ. Serv. Comm'n 1961).
Benton v. United States, 488 F.2d 1017, 1020 (Ct. C1. 1973).
See Karl Stecher, II Admin. L.2d (P & F) at 868.
37 Fed. Reg. 16,787 (1972).
92 Stat. 183 (1978).
438 U.S. 478 (1978).
Id. at 513.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1996

9

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 32 [1996], Iss. 2, Art. 2

TULSA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 32:203

and stressed "the importance of preserving the independent judgment of these
men and women."68
In view of the APA purpose to create an independent administrative judiciary, "functionally comparable" to the traditional court judiciary, a recent federal opinion is unfortunate.69 The opinion found that a Social Security ALJ
was biased because at the hearing he had expressed resentment at a district
court order remanding the case, made derogatory statements about one of the
examining physicians, and statements indicating a bias against Puerto Rican
applicants for disability benefits." The district court did not, however, stop
with a decision reversing and remanding. Instead, the court said, "In this instance.., a simple remand seems insufficient.... [T]he ALJ should be held
accountable for his conduct."'" Indeed, the court went so far as to state, "it
is ... this Court's hope that appropriate disciplinary action will be taken
against the ALJ in this case."'
The just-quoted statement is wholly contrary to the spirit of both the APA73
intent to create an independent administrative judiciary and the leading case
giving effect to that intent. To punish a judge for acts performed while he is
judging a case is wholly inconsistent with the notion of judicial independence.
It is ironic that the instant court urged the disciplining of the administrative
judge for action taken in hearing and deciding at the same time that judges
were loudly protesting statements urging the resignation or even the impeachment of a federal judge because of his ruling on admissibility of evidence in a
criminal case.74
It must also be pointed out that, under the APA, ALJs have hearing and
decision powers comparable to those of trial judges. They do not, it is true,
have the security of Article III independence and tenure; but their position is far
superior to what it was before the APA. ALJs may be appointed only from the
Office of Personnel Management's register of eligibles. 75 They receive an absolute appointment the day they enter on duty; they do not serve a probationary
period.76 They cannot be assigned to duties inconsistent with their judicial duties.'7 They can be removed only for good cause determined by the Merit Systems Protection Board after hearing.78

68. Id. at 514.
69. See Pastrana v. Chater, 917 F. Supp. 103 (D.P.R. 1996).
70. See id. at 110.
71. Id. at 111.
72. Id.
73. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
74. See Linda Greenhouse, Rehnquist Joins Fray on Rulings Defending Judicial Independence, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 10, 1996, at Al; Alison Mitchell, Clinton Defends His Criticism of a New York Judge's Ruling,
N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 3, 1996, at A12.
75. See 5 U.S.C. § 5372(b)(2) (1994).
76. See 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (1994).
77. See id.
78. See 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (a) (1994).
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On March 1, 1996, there were 1,343 ALJs in thirty federal agencies, distributed as follows:79
TOTAL NUMBER OF ALJs BY AGENCY
ALJs

DEPARTMENT
______

______

___

J Total
_

[Senior1

_

[AAs

4

4

0

Department of Commerce

1

0

1

Commodity Futures Trading Commission

2

0

2

Department of Education

1

0

1

Environmental Protection Agency

7

0

7

Federal Communications Commission

6

0

6

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

19

0

19

Federal Labor Relations Authority

5

0

5

Federal Maritime Commission

3

0

3

Federal Mine Safety & Health Review Commission

11

1

12

Federal Trade Commission

2

0

2

DHHS/Department Appeals Board

4

0

4

DHHS/Food and Drug Administration
Dept. of Housing & Urban Development

1
5

0
0

1
5

Department of the Interior
International Trade Commission

12

0

2

0

12
2

DOJ/Drug Enforcement Administration

2

0

2

DOJ/Office of Immigration Review

4

0

4

Department of Labor

Department of Agriculture

55

0

55

Merit Systems Protection Board

1

0

1

National Labor Relations Board

64

0

64

National Transportation Safety Board

4

0

4

Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission

15

0

15

Office of Financial Institution Adjudication

2

0

2

Securities and Exchange Commission

3

0

3

Small Business Administration

1

0

1

Social Security Administration

1,060

32

1,092

DOT/Coast Guard

9

0

9

DOT/Office of the Secretary

4

0

4

U.S. Postal Service

1

0

1

1,310

33

1,343

TOTAL

79. Memorandum from Bob Bell, Office of Personnel Management, to author (Mar. 1, 1996) (on file
with author). Senior ALJs are retired Al~s who have come back as reemployed annuitants.
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Decision Process
The most famous sentence in the first Morgan opinion is: "The one who
decides must hear."80 It is, of course, impossible to give literal effect to this
desideratum in any agency of consequence. At the same time, Morgan I did
show graphically the unsatisfactory situation that prevailed in the administrative
process of decision, where neither the one who heard nor the agency head in
whose name the decision was formally issued made the actual decision. By his
striking statement of the ideal - "The one who decides must hear" - Chief
Justice Hughes dramatized the institutional-decision problem and, as it turned
out, pointed the way to the remedy adopted by the APA: vest the one who
actually hears with the power to decide the case, at least initially.8
The APA turns around "the one who decides must hear" principle by vesting the one who hears with the power to decide. The ALJs - the administrative judiciary set up under the APA - have not only been given the judicial
title; they have also been vested with most of the decision-making power of
trial judges.82 The APA empowers the ALJ to issue an initial decision that becomes the decision of the agency unless appealed.83 It is true that the APA
gives the agency authority to require (in specific cases or by general rule) that
the record be certified directly to it for decision.84 In such a case, the agency
retains all decisionmaking power, with the ALJ relegated to authority only to
recommend a decision. In virtually all federal agencies, however, the power to
make an initial decision has been delegated to the ALL The result, in the vast
majority of federal agency cases, is to have an initial decision by the judge who
presided at the hearing.
Trial and Appellate Levels
What the APA did was to set up a virtual trial-appellate structure within
federal agencies. As far as it goes, the APA does much to resolve the institutional decision problem. At least at the trial level in the federal agencies, the
one who decides does hear and the one who hears does decide. At the ALI
level, there is now a personal process of hearing and decision similar to that
existing in a trial court. In this respect, the APA has made a fundamental
change in the agency decision process. The change, the D.C. circuit tells us, is
"far more than a quibble about semantics .... It means the difference between
a decision by an adjudicatory official with independent status, who saw the
witnesses' demeanor and gauged their truthfulness, and a decision by someone
who is an official of the prosecuting agency and who saw only a paper record." 5

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 481 (1936).
See 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (1994).
See id.
See id.
See Communications Satellite Corp. v. FCC, 611 F.2d 883, 887-88 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
Dart v. United States, 848 F.2d 217, 229-30 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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The APA is, however, not entirely consistent in carrying out the goal of
setting up trial and appellate tribunals within the agencies. The AD is, to be
sure, given authority to make an initial decision that becomes the final agency
decision if there is no appeal to the agency. However, if there is an appeal from
an initial decision, the agency is not limited to appellate power in deciding the
appeal. This was the rule of the Allentown case.86 The FCC there had reversed
an initial decision even though the examiner's findings had been based upon
demeanor.87 The court of appeals reversed, holding that findings based on demeanor were not to be overruled by an agency without a "very substantial preponderance in the testimony as recorded."88 In effect, the agency was limited
to appellate 9 power, with power to reverse only if the findings were "clearly
8

erroneous."

The Supreme Court in Allentown held that the limitation of the agency to
appellate power was not warranted." The APA provides expressly, "On appeal
from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it
would have in making the initial decision. ' '9' The agency on appeal from an
initial decision has all the decisionmaking powers of a tribunal of first instance. 92 While the agency may defer to ALJ findings, that is not compelled.93
The court's deference is to the agency and not the AL.
Under Allentown, the losing party in the initial decision stage has everything to gain by an appeal to the agency. Since the agency is not restricted to
appellate power, there is the same chance for a favorable decision on appeal
that there was at the trial level; the agency may decide for appellant even
though the findings below were not "clearly erroneous." 94 Acting under their
Allentown power, agencies felt completely free to reverse examiners' initial
decisions. In the FCC at the time of Allentown, the Commission actually reversed initial decisions in a majority of cases.9" The result was that losing parties tended to appeal initial decisions and the agencies had to decide as many
cases as they did before the APA.
However, in the more recent cases, there has, despite Allentown, been an
emerging doctrine of agency deference to ALJ decisions, particularly where
credibility is concerned. Thus, the courts are starting to treat the ALJ as the
primary judge of the evidence presented at the hearing.96 At the least, the recent federal cases hold that the agency is required to explain why it has rejected

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
fact..,
95.
96.

FCC v. Allentown Broadcasting Corp., 349 U.S. 358 (1955).
See id. at 359.
See id. at 364 (citing NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 190 F.2d 429, 430 (2d Cir. 1951).
See id.
See id. at 364-65.
5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (1994).
See id.
See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 680 (1980).
This is in contrast to FED. R. CIv. P. 52(a) which provides that a federal district court's "findings of
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous."
See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw § 7.26 (3rd ed. 1991).
See, e.g., Diaz v. Chater, 55 F.3d 300 (7th Cir. 1995).
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ALJ findings.97 In addition, the recent cases increasingly hold that, where there
are disagreements between the agency head and the ALJ on questions of fact
and credibility, the reviewing court may examine the evidence more critically in
deciding whether the agency decision is supported by substantial evidence.98
The federal courts can do even more toward assimilating the ALJ role to
that of a trial judge by following state cases that reverse where the agency
substituted its judgment for that of the hearing officer on factual findings or
reversed such findings that were supported by substantial evidence.99 Perhaps it
is too much to expect them to follow the example of a Florida court that holds
that an agency may not reject a hearing officer's finding unless there is no
competent substantial evidence from which the finding could reasonably be
inferred."°
SUGGESTIONS

Without a doubt, the APA has effected a quantum improvement in the
administrative adjudicatory process. One has only to compare adjudication
under the APA with the pre-APA situation, when Morgan I"° was descriptive
of the institutional decision process and "examiners ...were mere tools of the
agency concerned and subservient to the agency heads,"'"2 to realize the
APA's beneficial impact. As a general proposition, the adjudicatory process set
up by the APA should be maintained. Certain suggestions for improvement can,
nevertheless, be made.
Central ALI Corps
Under the APA, ALJs are appointed by and work within the different
agencies that are subject to APA formal hearing requirements. An increasing
number of states, on the other hand, have followed the example first set by
California in 19453 and set up a central pool of independent ALJs who are
assigned to different agencies as they are needed. In their systems, the ALJs are
an independent cadre of judges, who are part of an autonomous agency, not
subject to or part of the agencies for which they render adjudicatory decisions.

97. See, e.g., Reyes v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 242, 245 (10th Cir. 1988).
98. See, e.g., Aylent v. Secretary of HUD, 54 F.3d 1560, 1561 (10th Cir. 1995); Bechtel Constr. Co. v.
Secretary of Labor, 50 F.3d 926, 933 (11 th Cir. 1995).
99. See, e.g., Goin v. Commission on Ethics, 658 So. 2d 1131, 1138-39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995);
Berger v. Department of Prof'l Regulation, 653 So. 2d 479, 480 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Moran v. Shotgun
Willies, Inc., 889 P.2d 1185, 1188 (Mont. 1995).
100. See Crawley v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 616 So. 2d 1061, 1063 (Fla. App. 1993). See also
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11.425.50(b) (West Supp. 1996) (mandating that an ALT decision based upon credibility
must be given "great weight" on judicial review).
101. See Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 474 (1936).
102. Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Exam'rs Conference, 345 U.S. 128, 131 (1953).
103. Julian Mann, III, Striving for Efficiency in Administrative Litigation: North Carolina's Office of
Administrative Hearings, 15 J. NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN. L. JUDc.S 151, 157 (1995).
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By the end of 1995, twenty states had adopted central panel ALJ systems.' 4
Bills have been introduced to establish an independent federal ALJ corps,'
but they have thus far only crossed Woodrow Wilson's Congressional "bridge
of sighs to dim dungeons"'" of committee inaction.' 7
APA adjudication would be improved by passage of a bill to establish a
central federal ALJ corps. This is the logical last step in the half-century movement to assimilate administrative hearing officers to a veritable trial judiciary. It
must, however, be recognized that, as indicated, there is little likelihood of any
central ALJ corps bill being enacted by Congress in the foreseeable future.
Non-APA "AdministrativeJudges"
There are many more federal ALJs than there are Article III judges.' 3
But there are also many more non-APA hearing officers in federal agencies
than there are APA ALJs. Indeed, according to a recent estimate, there are over
twice as many non-APA "administrative judges" than APA ALJs.'t 9 According to a survey, there are 83 types of cases, totaling almost 350,000 a year, that
non-ALJs are conducting in federal agencies outside the APA adjudication
requirements."' These cases are heard by over 2,600 presiding officers;'
this non-ALJ corps is, as stated, more than twice as large as the AJ corps." 2
The largest group of non-ALJ "administrative judges" are the near 200 "immigration judges" who hear and decide immigration cases in the Department of
Justice. ' 3 They account for almost half the cases dealt with by non-ALJ personnel."' Adjudicatory decisions are also made, in large numbers, by nonALJs in the Departments of Health and Human Services and Veterans Affairs.' Compared to APA ALJs, these non-AJ hearer-deciders have "less
decisional independence, lower pay and benefits, and less job security. The
selection and appointment procedures for [them] are controlled by the agencies
themselves."" 6

104. See id.
105. See, e.g., H.R. 1802, 104th Cong. (1995); S. 486, 104th Cong. (1995).
106. WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 66 (10th prtg. 1893).
107. However, there was a Senate hearing on such a bill. Administrative Law Judge Corps Act: Hearing
on S. 594 before the Subcomm. on Courts and Administrative Practice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
101st Cong. (1989).
108. See A. Leo Levin & Michael E. Kunz, Thinking About Judgeships, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1627, 1649
(1995).
109. See id. at 1649 n.84.
110. See Paul R. Verkuil, Reflections upon the FederalAdministrativeJudiciary, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1341,
1345 (1992).
11I. See Jeffrey S. Lubbers, APA-Adjudication: Is the Quest for Uniformity Faultering?, 10 ADMIN. LJ.
AM. U. 65, 71 (1996).
112. See supra text accompanying note 109.
113. See Lubbers, supra note 111, at 71.
114. See id. During the 1995 fiscal year, immigration judges decided 138,023 deportation cases and
66,064 asylum cases. Charles Finnie, Playing Public Officer and Judge; Can INS Handle New Deportation
Power?, LEGAL TIMES, May 6, 1996, at 2.
115. See Verkuil, supra note 110, at 1345-46.
116. Id. at 1347.
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There is little justification for second-class administrative justice presided
over by non-ALJs, particularly in cases, such as those under the Immigration
Act, that affect personal rather than property rights. Despite protests to the
contrary, the title "immigration judge" is a euphemism, if not an oxymoron." 7
At the least, deportation proceedings, which "may result ... in loss of both
property and life, or of all that makes life worth living,""' 8 should be subject
to the APA, especially the ALJ requirement. Here, too, however, it must be
recognized that it is most unlikely that Congress will replace the non-ALJ hearers-deciders with APA ALJs. Budgetary constraints, if nothing else, will prevent
the provision of the fairer (and more expensive) adjudicatory system.
Allentown Repeal
Despite the recent case law favoring greater agency deference toward ALJ
decisions, Allentown"9 remains the governing rule. Ultimately, then, ALJ decisions are still subject to complete agency review power. The Allentown rule
should be eliminated by a statute limiting the agency on appeals from ALJ
decisions to appellate power. Congress could accomplish this by removing from
section 557(b) of the APA the provision: "On appeal from or review of the
initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have in making
the initial decision."' 20 In its place, there should be a provision that, on review
of an ALJ initial decision, the agency shall have only the powers of review that
a court has upon judicial review of the agency's decisions.'
CONCLUSION
During the half-century it has been in operation, the APA is the law "that
has made all the difference" in administrative adjudicatory procedure. When we
compare the pre-APA hearing and decision process with that under the APA,
we seem now to be in another, and altogether different, administrative law
world. Above all, there is the quantum change from the Morgan 1 decision
process to an administrative counterpart of the decision process in the courts.
Instead of hearings before "mere tools of the agency concerned,"'2" there are
veritable trials, comparable to those in courts, before a federal administrative
judiciary - "a corps of deciders who today rival federal and state judges in
terms of their qualifications and benefits."'24 The present ALJ corps is the
APA's greatest adjudicatory accomplishment.

117.
118.
119.
120.

But see William Robie, A Response to Professor Verkuil, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1365, 1366-67 (1992).
Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922).
See FCC v. Allentown Broadcasting Corp., 349 U.S. 358 (1955).
5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (1995).

121.

See COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT, TASK

FORCE REPORT ON LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURE 203 (1955).
122. Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936).
123. Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Exam'rs Conference, 345 U.S. 128 (1953).
124. See Verkuil, supra note I10, at 1352.
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The evolving system of administrative justice under the APA brings to
mind an opinion of Justice Jackson years ago, which referred to the distinction
between American law, in which one system of law courts applies both public
and private law, and the practice in a Continental country such as France, which
administers public law through a system of administrative courts separate from
those dealing with private law questions." The French administrative courts
are specialized tribunals that review the legality of administrative acts. 6 Although proposals have been made for establishment of comparable American
administrative courts, the French concept of administrative reviewing courts has
largely remained foreign to American administrative lawyers.
Under the APA, however, our system has taken its own path toward establishment of an administrative judiciary - but, in the American version, an
administrative trial judiciary. The history of hearing officers under the APA,
culminating in their present judicial status, has set the pattern for the developing
American administrative justice. In particular, we can project a continuing increase in the size of the administrative judicial corps. When the APA provisions
went into effect, the federal agencies employed 197 examiners. There are now
more than six times as many ALJs in the federal agencies. 7 Only the fiscal
squeeze of recent years has prevented the number from rising substantially
higher. In the next century, we can predict that there may well be a federal
administrative judiciary that completely dwarfs the traditional judiciary - with
ALJs in ever-increasing numbers dispensing both regulatory justice and the
mass justice of the Welfare State.

125.
126.
WORLD
127.

See Garner v. Teamsters Local, 346 U.S. 485, 495 (1953).
See generally BERNARD SCHWARTZ, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE COMMON-LAW
19-50 (1954).
See text accompanying supra note 79.
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